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The Troubling Turn in State
Preemption: The Assau t on
Progressive Cities and PH
Cities Can Respond
Richard Briffault, Nestor Davidson, Paul A. Diller,
Olatunde Johnson, and Richard C. Schragger
n an era of paralysis and increasingly bitter partisan conflict at the national level,
cities have become a critical source of innovation across a wide array of policy
areas that advance inclusion, equitable opportunity, and social justice. In recent
years, cities and other local governments have taken the lead in enacting minimum
wage and paid sick leave policies, expanding the boundaries of civil rights, responding
to emerging environmental threats, tackling public health challenges, and advancing
other important progressive goals.
Increasingly, however, states have been working to shut down this local innovation
through legislation that either overrides-"preempts"-local policies or withdraws
authority from local governments. North Carolina's success in blocking the city of
Charlotte's ordinance extending municipal non-discrimination protections to gay, les-
bian, bisexual and transgender people appropriately sparked national outrage, but it is
only one high-profile example. States have left almost no area of local policy free from
preemption-increasingly expressing political differences through a legal tool originally
designed to protect legitimate state interests in uniformity and to police against truly
recalcitrant localities. The trend toward intrusive state oversight has been most notable
in-but is by no means exclusive to-states with conservative state governments that
are home to progressive cities, and these conflicts have been growing in recent years.
As troubling as the current wave of preemption has been, states are also now edging
into new, uncharted legal territory by seeking to punish cities and even individual local
officials who defy them. States have adopted statutes that threaten to withhold funding
and expose cities to private liability in preemption conflicts as well as enacted laws
that seek to impose personal civil penalties-and in some instances, even potential
criminal liability-on mayors, city council members, police chiefs and other local
officials who defy state legislation.
In the face of all of this, some cities, officials, and citizens have been fighting back,
defending against preemption with claims based on state constitutional "home rule"
immunity, state constitutional constraints on unfairly targeting local governments, as
well as federal equal protection, due process, and other constitutional arguments.
Despite their limited formal authority, cities have sometimes been successful in pro-
tecting local democracy. Overall, while the legal structure of intrastate preemption
does not favor cities, given the contemporary landscape of increasing state hostility,
there is an urgency to thinking creatively about new legal arguments, as well as build-
ing on instances of successful local advocacy, where they can be found.
* This Issue Brief was initially published in September 2017.
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This Issue Brief canvasses the current wave of preemption and the primary legal
theories that these state-local conflicts present, as well as claims that might arise as
these battles continue.' The Brief also explores other possibilities for strengthening
home rule to advance progressive local policymaking at a moment when cities increas-
ingly stand on the front lines of economic justice, civil rights, sustainable development,
and so many other critical policy domains.
Of course, preemption can be an important progressive tool for states to check
local parochialism, as fights over exclusionary zoning have amply demonstrated. Any
legal strategy to bolster local democracy must be calibrated to take into account this
countervailing concern so that strong federal and state laws on civil, labor, environ-
mental and other rights remain an important baseline that localities cannot undermine.
That said, the current wave of preemption has all too often focused on displacing
progressive local policy innovation.
I. HOME RULE AND IMMUNITY FROM STATE OVERRIDE
To understand current state-local conflicts, it is helpful to start-briefly-with
some basics. Cities derive their power to determine their own policies as well as the
contours of their independence through what is known as home rule.2 Home rule has
two aspects: initiative and immunity.3 The power of initiative "enable [s] local govern-
ments to undertake actions over a range of important issues without having to run to
the state for specific authorization."4 This aspect of home rule in the United States is
widespread, with at least forty states delegating some significant, presumptive author-
ity to local governments-typically cities, but in some states also counties-to initiate
policies without prior state legislative authorization. The power of immunity, by con-
trast, "protect [s] local government decisions concerning local action from displacement
by state law."5
1 Under the Trump Administration, federal-local conflicts are emerging as a troubling flashpoint,
with conflicts over so-called "sanctuary cities" as an early example. This Issue Brief focuses on state-local
conflicts, recognizing that many of the same concerns are at issue when the federal government acts to
preempt local (and state) policymaking.
2 Historically, home rule reflected dissatisfaction with the "scant authority" provided to cities by an
early American rule of construction known as Dillon's Rule. See Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U.
L. REV. 1113, 1124 (2007). Dillon's Rule, developed by Judge John E Dillon in the late 1800s, stands for the
idea that "municipalities possess[] only those powers indispensable to the purposes of their incorporation
as well as any others expressly bestowed upon them by the state." Id. at 1122-23. Generally, a Dillon's Rule
regime provides "few opportunities for cities to engage in substantive policymaking." Id. at 1123. At the
end of the nineteenth century, discontent with Dillon's Rule reached a critical mass, and "states gradually
began to grant more substantive policymaking power... to their cities." Id. at 1124. This initial form of
home rule, called imperium in imperio, or simply imperio, "granted substantive lawmaking power to cities,
but generally limited this authority to matters of 'local concern'," with the interpretation of "local concern"
left to the state courts. Id. at 1124-25. Beginning in the 1950s, a second wave of home-rule reform focused
on creating "a more flexible and less formalistic method for distributing power to cities," granting "police
powers" to local governments through statutes, "subject to denial of power in a particular substantive field
by specific act of the state legislature." Id. at 1125; see also Lynn A. Baker & Daniel B. Rodriguez,
Constitutional Home Rule and Judicial Scrutiny, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1337, 1338-39 (2009). This method
presumed "that cities would have any power the state possessed, unless the state legislature had exclusively
reserved power over a particular subject matter to the state." Diller, supra, at 1125.
3 RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAW 346 (8th ed. 2016).
4 Id.
s Id. Currently roughly fifteen states provide some form of home rule immunity. See Paul A. Diller,
Reorienting Home Rule: Part 2-Remedying the Urban Disadvantage Through Federalism and Localism,
77 LA. L. REV. 1045, 1066 (2017).
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Within the basic framework of home rule, important features vary by state. First,
home rule regimes can be rooted in the state constitution, defined by state statute, or
derived from a hybrid model, with the state constitution structuring home rule but
leaving it to the legislature to elaborate. Similarly, in some states, the state constitution
authorizes, but does not compel, the legislature to create a system of home rule for
municipalities.6 In some states, the judiciary has interpreted state statutes delegating
broad power to local entities as implicitly rejecting an older, restrictive rule of construc-
tion.7 In other states, the state legislation granting power to local governments makes
clear that this restrictive view no longer applies.8 Constitutional home rule is generally
more protective of local authority than statutory delegations, both because it is harder
to amend state constitutions and, of course, because constitutions trump statutes.
Whether constitutional or statutory, home rule provisions generally delegate pre-
sumptive power to local governments across a broad swath of subjects, often with
limitations over specific subject matters, such as the power to tax or create felony
offenses,9 or substantive power over "civil or private law."o The National League of
Cities (NLC) has usefully broken down home rule into structural, personnel, regula-
tory, and fiscal categories.1 Structural authority is the power to design one's type of
government, including issues such as the number of city councilors, whether elections
are by district or at-large, the length of terms, and rules for how campaigns are
financed. Personnel authority is the power to manage and set compensation and ben-
efits for a city's personnel. Regulatory power, what the NLC calls "functional" author-
ity, includes the "police power" authority to regulate for the health, safety, welfare,
and morals of the community. This authority is arguably the most significant form of
home rule for preemption purposes because cities often rely on this strand when they
impose requirements on private businesses or property owners.
On fiscal home rule-the authority to raise revenue, borrow money, and spend-
many state constitutional restrictions and statutes highly constrain local authority,
although the details vary significantly by state. Some states specifically exclude taxing
6 In some states, moreover, the foundations for home rule may be different for different types of
government. The state constitution may create home rule for cities but not for counties, or vice versa. In
some states, the constitution singles out specific cities for home-rule powers. E.g., MD. CONST. art. XI-A,
§ 1 (establishing home rule for the city of Baltimore and counties). In others, the constitution or statutes
establish a population minimum, or an opt-in requirement through the adoption of a charter that triggers
home rule authority. E.g., COLO. CONST. art. XX, 5 6 (minimum population of 2,000 to adopt municipal
home rule charter); WASH. CONST. art. XI, 5 10 (requiring population of 10,000 for city to frame charter).
Some states, by contrast, automatically provide home rule to cities of a certain size but allow them to opt
out. E.g., ILL. CONST. art. VII. 55 6(a), (b) (allowing cities of 25,000 or greater to opt out of home rule).
7 See supra note 2 (discussing Dillon's Rule, the older, restrictive view of local authority).
Compare State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116, 1127 (Utah 1980) (holding that "the Dillon Rule of
strict construction is not to be used to restrict the power of a county under a grant by the Legislature of
general welfare power or prevent counties from using reasonable means to implement specific grants of
authority"), with IND. CODE 5 36-1-3-3 (2017) (abrogating anti-local judicial canons of statutory
construction).
9 E.g., IOWA CONST. art. III, 5 38A ("[Municipalities] shall not have power to levy any tax unless
expressly authorized by the general assembly."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 22, 5 802 (2017) (excluding the
"power to define and provide for the punishment of a felony" from grant of power to municipalities).
See generally Wayne A. Logan, The Shadow Criminal Law of Municipal Governance, 62 OHIO ST. L.J.
1409 (2001).
10 See Paul A. Diller, The City and the Private Right of Action, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1109,1110 (2012).
11 NAT'L LEAGUE OF CITIES, CITIES 101-DELEGATION OF POWER, http://www.nlc.org/resource/
cities-101-delegation-of-power (last visited Sept. 8, 2017).
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authority from their grant of home-rule powers. 12 Other states presumptively grant
the power to tax through their home-rule provisions, but impose numerous other
restrictions in separate constitutional or statutory provisions. In light of the various
restrictions many states have imposed, commentators consider fiscal home rule the
weakest category of city authority.14
A final category can be added to the four identified by the NLC. In addition to their
regulatory powers, cities may use their ability, akin to that of other market actors, to
enter into contracts, sell or lease property, or provide services to affect the behavior
of the firms with which they do business. This "proprietary" authority enables them
to require contractors who work on municipal projects to pay a higher wage or offer
workplace benefits not required of other firms,s or impose higher standards of non-
discrimination on services they offer, such as housing and public transportation.
Breaking down home rule into these categories is helpful in assessing the immunity,
if any, that state constitutions confer on local lawmaking from state override. In states
with pure "legislative" systems of home rule, where the constitution grants all powers
to cities minus those preempted by the legislature, every and all local power can be
preempted so long as the legislature is sufficiently clear about its intent. With other
forms of home rule, however, the situation is more complicated. In some states, person-
nel, structural, proprietary, and some regulatory issues may enjoy outright or modified
immunity to preemption.1 7 In a handful of states, the constitution expressly allows for
certain local enactments to trump state law." In other states, supreme courts have read
state constitutions as protecting certain local enactments-usually structural, propri-
etary, or personnel-from state override or imposing certain conditions on state over-
ride. As discussed below, moreover, the state constitution and the judiciary in some
states require that in order to preempt effectively, state laws must be of a "general" or
"uniform" nature. In some states, this requirement is merely formalistic-preemptive
legislation must treat all home-rule cities or counties equally. In other states, the require-
ment contains a substantive component: courts inquire into whether the preemptive
legislation truly addresses a "statewide concern," as determined by the judiciary. 9
12 See, e.g., IOWA CONST. art. III, 5 38A; see also MASS. CONST. AMEND. art. 2, 5 7 (withholding
from cities and towns "the power to ... levy, assess and collect taxes [and] to borrow money or pledge
the credit of the city or town").
13 E.g., CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA (limiting local governments' ability to raise revenue through property
and other taxes).
14 See, e.g., Erin Adele Scharff, Powerful Cities?: Limits on Municipal Taxing Authority and What
to Do About Them, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 292, 296 (2016).
iS See, e.g., Scott L. Cummings & Steven A. Boutcher, Mobilizing Local Government Law for
Low-Wage Workers, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 187, 193-94 (noting that "the most common approach to the
living wage ... is to tie living wage compliance to a direct financial relationship between the city and
private employer").
16 Some of the earliest civil rights legislation at any level of government were local ordinances that
emerged in the late 1940s preventing racial and national origin discrimination in city-owned and oper-
ated housing. See Pamela H. Rice & Milton Greenberg, Municipal Protection of Human Rights, 1952
Wis. L. REV. 679, 684.
17 Preemption can come through ordinary state legislation or from voters, through referenda or
initiatives.
1s E.g., COLO. CONST. art. XX, 5 6 (declaring that local charters and ordinances involving "local
and municipal matters ... shall supersede ... any law of the state in conflict therewith").
19 E.g., Jacobberger v. Terry, 320 N.W.2d 903, 905-06 (Neb. 1982) (upholding statute requiring
district elections for Omaha city council due to state concern for more proportional representation of
socioeconomic classes in local governing body).
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All told, then, home rule defines local autonomy through both the power to initiate
policy and the ability to protect that policymaking from state displacement. 20
II. LOCAL INNOVATION AND STATE HOSTILITY: THE NEW
PREEMPTION
States have traditionally exercised preemptive oversight to advance legitimate state
interests in uniformity or to rein in local governments whose actions have clear nega-
tive effects beyond their borders or interfere with state regulatory programs. In recent
years, however, without much attention or national appreciation, states have increas-
ingly shifted toward using preemption as a tool to block local initiatives in areas of
local concern, with many conflicts focused on areas of progressive policy facing con-
servative backlash at the state level. 21
This Part canvasses several paradigmatic examples of state overrides-in labor and
employment, civil rights, environmental protection, public health and firearms safety,
as well as with sanctuary cities-to illustrate how sweeping preemption of local poli-
cymaking is becoming. It then explains the rise of "punitive preemption"-legislation
that goes beyond merely overriding local policy to punishing local governments and
local officials over policy disagreements.
A. LOCAL POWER UNDER SIEGE
Labor and employment is an area where cities have played an essential role in rais-
ing the minimum wage and expanding worker benefits above the level set by federal
and state law. In the face of that progress, at least twenty-five states have preempted
local authority over private-sector minimum wage rules. 22 At least eighteen states
preempt local authority to regulate the amount of paid or unpaid leave that private
20 For a survey of the current landscape of home rule in every state, as well as other background on
preemption, see https://www.urbanlawcenter.org/enter-leap.
21 For excellent discussions of the full breadth of contemporary preemption practices, see NATIONAL
LEAGUE OF CITIES, CITY RIGHTS IN AN ERA OF PREEMPTION: A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS (2017),
available at http://nlc.org/preemption (discussing state preemption of local policies in the areas of mini-
mum wage, paid sick leave, anti-discrimination, the sharing economy, municipal broadband, tax and
expenditures, public health, plastic bags, firearm safety, inclusionary zoning and rent control); Lori
Riverstone-Newell, The Rise of State Preemption Laws in Response to Local Policy Innovation, 47
PUBLIUS 403 (2017) (canvassing preemption conflicts).
22 These states include Alabama, see ALA. CODE 25-7-41(b) (2017); Arkansas, see ARK. CODE ANN.
5 11-4-221 (2017); Colorado, see COLO. REV. STAT. 5 8-6-101(3)(a) (2017); Florida, see FLA. STAT. 5
218.077(2) (2017); Georgia, see GA. CODE ANN. 534-4-3.1 (2017); Idaho, see IDAHO CODE 544-1502(4)
(2017); Indiana, see IND. CODE S 22-2-2-10.5 (2017); Iowa, see IOWA CODE S 331.304(12) (2017); Kansas,
see KAN. STAT. ANN. 5 12-16,130 (2017); Kentucky, see Kentucky Rest. Ass'n v. Louisville/Jefferson Cty.
Metro Gov't, 501 S.W.3d 425 (Ky. 2016); Louisiana, see LA. STAT. ANN. 5 23:642(B) (2017); Michigan,
see MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 5 123.1385 (West 2017); Mississippi, see Miss. CODE ANN. 5 17-1-51 (2017);
Missouri, see Mo. REV. STAT. 5 290.528 (2017); North Carolina, see 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws 4 5 1;
Oklahoma, see OKLA. STAT. tit. 40, 5 160 (2017); Oregon, see OR. REV. STAT. 5 653.017 (2015);
Pennsylvania, see 43 PA. CONS. STAT. 5 333.114a (2017); Rhode Island, see 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS 5 28-
12-25; South Carolina, see S.C. CODE ANN. 5 6-1-130 (2017); Tennessee (2013), see TENN. CODE ANN.
5 50-2-112 (2017); Texas, see TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. 5 62.0515 (West 2017); Utah, see UTAH CODE ANN.
534-40-106 (West 2017); and Wisconsin, see Wis. STAT. 5 104.001 (2017). Ohio also attempted to preempt
local minimum wage regulations (see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 5 4111.02 (West 2017)), but the statute has
been struck down at the trial court level for violating the state constitution's single subject rule, see City
of Bexley v. State of Ohio, (Court of Common Pleas, Franklin County, June 2, 2017, Case No: 17CV-
2672); but see City of Hudson v. State of Ohio (Court of Common Pleas, Summit County, July 7, 2017,
Case No: CV-2017-03-1103) (finding the same statute did embrace a single subject). See also NATIONAL
LEAGUE OF CITIES, supra note 21 (discussing minimum wage and paid sick leave preemption).
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employers provide their employees.23 And at least eleven states preempt local authority
to regulate other types of benefits that private employers provide their employees. 24
In the civil rights arena, Arkansas, North Carolina, and Tennessee have enacted
legislation that-despite taking somewhat different forms-effectively preempted
local antidiscrimination laws that are more protective than state law. 25 To avoid lan-
guage that facially repeals protections for particular social groups, some of these state
preemptive measures have been framed as the protection of "intrastate commerce."
Yet each of these states acted after one of their cities adopted a local ordinance expand-
ing antidiscrimination protection on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.
For example, after the City Council in Charlotte enacted an ordinance that prohibited
businesses from discriminating against customers on the basis of sexual orientation
or gender identity and permitted transgender individuals to use facilities corresponding
to their gender identity, North Carolina passed legislation to preempt the Charlotte
ordinance. 26 In addition to prohibiting local antidiscrimination laws pertaining to
employment and public accommodations, the North Carolina law required that " [p]
ublic agencies ... require multiple occupancy bathrooms or changing facilities... be
designated for and only used by individuals based on their biological sex" and defined
23 These states include Alabama, see ALA. CODE 5 11-80-16 (2017); see also ALA. CODE 5 25-7-41
(2017); Arkansas, see ARK. CODE ANN. 5 11-4-221 (2017); Florida, see FLA. STAT. 5 218.077 (2017);
Georgia, see GA. CODE ANN. 5 34-4-3.1 (2017); Indiana, see IND. CODE 5 22-2-16-3 (2017); Iowa, see
IOWA CODE 5 331.304(12) (2017); Kansas, see KAN. STAT. ANN. 5 12-16,130 (2017); Louisiana, see LA.
STAT. ANN. 5 23:642 (2017); Michigan, see MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN. 5 123.1388 (West 2017); Mississippi,
see Miss. CODE ANN. 5 17-1-51 (2017); Missouri, see Mo. REV. STAT. 5 290.528 (2017); NORTH CAROLINA,
see 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws 4 5 1; Oklahoma, see OKLA. STAT. tit. 40, 5 160 (2017); Oregon, see OR. REV.
STAT. 5 653.661 (2015) (sick leave); South Carolina, see S.C. CODE ANN. 5 41-1-25 (2017); Tennessee,
see TENN. CODE ANN. 5 7-51-1802 (2017), and Wisconsin, see Wis. STAT. 5 103.10 (1m) (2017). Arizona's
preemption of local paid sick and family leave policies (see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 23-204 (2017)), was
recently struck down at the trial court level as violating the state's Voter Protection Act, which essentially
prevents the state Legislature from tampering with voter-approved initiatives such as the 2013 initiative
that protected local laws on minimum wage and "other benefits" from state preemption. See United Food
and Commercial Workers Local 99 v. Arizona (Superior Court, Maricopa County, CV2016-092409,
August 30, 2017). Ohio also attempted to preempt local leave regulations in the same statute that covered
minimum wage regulations (see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 5 4113.85 (West 2017)), leading to the same liti-
gation split over the single-subject question. See supra note 22.
24 These states include Alabama (2016), see ALA. CODE 5 25-7-41 (2017); Arizona (2013), see ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. 5 23-204 (2017); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 23-205 (2017) (scheduling); Florida
(2013), see FLA. STAT. 5 218.077 (2017); Georgia (2004), see GA. CODE ANN. 5 34-4-3.1 (2017); Indiana
(2013), see IND. CODE 5 22-2-16-3 (2017); Kansas (2013), see KAN. STAT. ANN. 5 12-16,130 (2017); Michigan
(2015), see MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN. 5 123.1386 (West 2017) (including wages or benefits in the prevailing
community), see also MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN. 5 123.1391 (West 2017) (cannot require giving of specific
fringe benefits or covering expenses), and MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN. 5 123.1389 (West 2017) (scheduling
and hours); Missouri (2015), see Mo. REV. STAT. 5 290.528 (2017); North Carolina (2016), see 2017 N.C.
Sess. Laws 4 5 1; Tennessee (2013), see TENN. CODE ANN. 5 7-51-1802(c) (2017) (health insurance benefits);
and Pennsylvania (1996), see Bldg. Owners & Managers Ass'n of Pittsburgh v. City of Pittsburgh, 985 A.2d
711, 714 (Pa. 2009) (holding that Pennsylvania state law prohibits certain municipalities from regulating
businesses by determining their "duties, responsibilities, or requirements.").
2s See Intrastate Commerce Improvement Act, ARK. CODE ANN. 55 14-1-402-403 (2015); 2016 N.C.
Sess. Laws 3 55 1-3 repealed by 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws 4 5 1; Equal Access to Intrastate Commerce Act,
TENN. CODE ANN. 5 7-51-1802 (2017). See infra text accompanying notes 26-27 (discussing the North
Carolina statute).
26 See 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws 3 55 1-3 repealed by 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws 4 5 1.
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"biological sex" as " [t]he physical condition of being male or female, which is stated
on a person's birth certificate."2 7
Preemption of local environmental protection is also growing. Seven states, includ-
ing Oklahoma and Texas, for example, have explicitly preempted local regulation of
hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, 28 and the Colorado Supreme Court invalidated two
cities' restrictions on fracking and the storage of fracking waste within the cities' limits
in 2016, on the grounds that they conflicted with the state Oil and Gas Conservation
Act. 29 Arizona, Idaho, New York, and seven other states explicitly preempt localities
from banning plastic bags.30 And twenty-nine states explicitly preempted local pesti-
cide regulation, as of 2013.
On the public health front, thirty-one states have some form of preemption of local
regulation of tobacco productS3 2 and at least seven states preempt local regulation of
e-cigarettes." Nine states currently preempt local actions with respect to nutrition
and food policy, with laws ranging from barring local regulations that require nutri-
tion labeling, as in Alabama, to barring local laws that prevent restaurants from includ-
ing toys in children's meals, as in Wisconsin.34 Similarly, forty-three states have enacted
broad preemption statutes related to firearms and ammunition, with eleven states
27 See id. The Act further defined "public agencies" to include, among other entities, the state execu-
tive, judicial and legislative branches, including the University of North Carolina system. See id. After much
controversy, the North Carolina bill was superseded by a replacement statute that nonetheless still preempted
local governments from regulating "access to multiple occupancy restrooms, showers, or changing facili-
ties." 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws 4 5 2. The replacement statute also prohibits-until December 1, 2020-local
governments from regulating private employment practices or regulating public accommodations.
21 See Riverstone-Newell, supra note 21, at 411. Oklahoma's 2015 preemptive statute provides that
political subdivisions "may not effectively prohibit or ban any oil and gas operations, including oil and
gas exploration, drilling, fracture stimulation, completion, production, maintenance, plugging and aban-
donment, produced water disposal, secondary recovery operations, flow and gathering lines or pipeline
infrastructure," with few exceptions, see OKLA. STAT., tit. 52, 5 137.1 (2016), and the 2015 Texas statute
is similar. See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. 5 81.0523 (West 2017).
29 City of Longmont v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass'n, 369 P.3d 573, 585 (Col. 2016).
30 State Plastic and Paper Bag Legislation, NATIONAL CONF. OF STATE LEGS., http://www.ncsl.org/
research/environment-and-natural-resources/plastic-bag-legislation.aspx; 2017 NY Sess. Laws Ch. 7
(McKinney).
31 Most of these states' laws read very similar to the American Legislative Exchange Council's
(ALEC) Model State Preemption Act. This Model Act states that "No city, town, county, or other politi-
cal subdivision of this state shall adopt or continue in effect any ordinance, rule, regulation or statute
regarding pesticide sale or use, including without limitation: registration, notification of use, advertising
and marketing, distribution, applicator training and certification, storage, transportation, disposal,
disclosure of confidential information, or product composition." Matthew Porter, State Preemption Law:
The Battle for Local Control ofDemocracy, BEYOND PESTICIDES, available at http://www.beyondpes-
ticides.org/assets/media/documents/lawn/activist/documents/StatePreemption.pdf.
32 Ctr. For Disease Control & Prev. Preemption on Advertising, Licensure, Smoke-free Indoor Air,
and Youth Access (2016), https://www.cdc.gov/statesystem/preemption.html.
" These states include ARK. CODE ANN. 5 26-57-267 (2017); IOWA CODE 5 453A.56 (2017); NEV.
REV. STAT. 5 202.249(4) (2017); OKLA. STAT. tit. 37 5 600.10 (2017); S.C. CODE ANN. 5 16-17-504 (2017);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 5 34-46-6 (2017); WASH. REV. CODE 5 70.345.210 (2017). See also Patrick Kabat,
Note, "Till Naught But Ash Is Left To See": Statewide Smoking Bans, Ballot Initiatives, and the Public
Sphere, 9 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHICS 128, 137-45 (2009) (examining the landscape of state
preemption of the local regulation of second-hand smoke).
34 ALA. CODE 5 20-1-7 (2017); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 44-1380 (2017); FLA. STAT. 5 509.032(7)
(a) (2017); GA. CODE ANN. 5 26-2-373 (a) (2017); KAN. STAT. ANN. 5 12.16,137 (2017); Miss. CODE
ANN. 5 75-29-901 (2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 5 3717.53 (West 2017); UTAH CODE ANN. 55 10-8-44.5,
17-50-329 (West 2017); Wis. STAT. 5 66.0418 (2017).
10 Hyml00
absolutely preempting all municipal firearm regulations, including New Mexico, which
took the extreme step of amending its state constitution to enshrine the ban. 5
Finally-although this brief survey does not come close to covering the entire range
of contemporary preemption legislation"-the issue of sanctuary cities is emerging
as another front in state-local conflicts. 7 While Arizona, Georgia, Indiana, Missouri,
and North Carolina all had bans against sanctuary cities that predated last fall's
presidential election,3 8 since the election and President Trump's targeting of this issue
in one of his first Executive Orders,39 Mississippi and Texas have both passed sweeping
preemption bills,40 while the Governor of Virginia vetoed a similar set of restrictions,41
and similar provisions have been introduced in a number of states. 42
B. THE TROUBLING EMERGENCE OF PUNITIVE PREEMPTION
The examples above illustrate ways in which current preemptive laws are funda-
mentally altering the nature of local power. But adding to this is the emergence of an
even more troubling form of preemption that seeks to punish local governments and
local officials for disagreeing with their states.
Traditionally, state preemption simply rendered local measures ineffective but now
states want to go further and actually punish cities and their officials for adopting
preempted measures -- or even failing to formally repeal local laws that have been
rendered legally ineffective. Arizona, for example, now provides that local
35 These states are Arkansas, see ARK. CODE ANN. 5 14-54-1411 (2017); Indiana, see IND. CODE §
35-47-11.1-2 (2017); Iowa, see IOWA CODE 5 724.28 (2017); Kentucky, see KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 65.870
(West 2017); Michigan, see MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 5 123.1102 (West 2017); New Mexico, see N.M.
CONST. art. II, 5 6; Oregon, see OR. REV. STAT. 5 166.170 (2017); Rhode Island, see 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS. 5
11-47-58 (2017); South Dakota, see S.D. CODIFIED LAWs 557-18A-36, 8-5-13, 9-19-20 (2017); Utah, see UTAH
CODE ANN. 5 76-10-500 (2017); and Vermont, see VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24 5 2295 (2017). See generally Joseph
Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 YALE L.J. 82 (2013) (arguing that Second Amendment doctrine should
distinguish between urban and rural localism in the latitude allowed for local regulation of firearms).
36 Two other notable areas of preemption, among others, include municipal broadband (with sev-
enteen states preempting local authority) and the sharing economy (with at least thirty-nine states pre-
empting local control in various forms). See NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES, supra note 21.
37 The term "sanctuary city" is contested, but generally refers to local governments that adopt inclusive
local policies regarding undocumented immigrants. See Rose Cuison Villazor, "Sanctuary Cities" and Local
Citizenship, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 573, 575-76 (2010) (discussing a range of sanctuary policies).
38 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 11-1051 (2017) (effective July 29, 2010); GA. CODE ANN. 5 36-80-23
(2017) (effective May 5, 2009); IND. CODE 5 5-2-18.2-4 (2017) (effective July 1, 2011); Mo. REV. STAT.
5 67.307 (2016) (effective January 1, 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. 5 153A-145.5 (2017) (effective October 1,
2015). Although the Arizona law was partially struck down by the Supreme Court in Arizona v. United
States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012), key preemption provisions remain.
39 See Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799 (Jan. 25, 2017).
40 2017 Miss. LAWS CH. 383 (S.B. 2710); 2017 TEx. SESS. LAW SERV. CH. 4 (S.B. 4) (Vernon's). On
August 30, 2017, the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas issued a preliminary
injunction against a number of provisions of the Texas anti-sanctuary law, Senate Bill 4, federal preemp-
tion, First Amendment, Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process grounds, which
the Fifth Circuit subsequently partially stayed. See City of El Cenizo v. State of Texas, No. SA-17-CV-
404-OLG, 2017 WL 3763098 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (order granting preliminary injunction), injunction
partially stayed by City of El Cenizo v. State of Texas, No. 17-50762 (5th Cir. Sep. 25, 2017).
41 H.B. 2000, Reg. Session (Va. 2017); Governor Veto Message: H.B. 2000, March 27 2017, https://
lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?171+amd+HB2000AG.
42 See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE SANCTUARY BILLS (May 8,2017),
available at http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/immig/StateSanctuaryBills_050817.pdf.
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governments risk losing state funding if they do not act to remove laws that the state
Attorney General determines to be in conflict with state law. 43
Even more troubling, however, are states that have begun authorizing civil and even
criminal sanctions against local officials in preemption conflicts. This trend began in
2003, when Oklahoma amended its firearm preemption statute to allow for personal
civil liability against officials who vote to enact laws conflicting with the state's firearm
preemption statute.44 In 2011, Florida went further, enacting a range of sanctions for
"knowing and willful violations" of the state's firearm preemption statute. These
provisions allow courts to impose civil fines on individual officials of up to $5,000,45
bar officials from using public funds for their legal defense or to reimburse them for
the fine, 46 and provide that violation of the statute constitutes cause for termination
of employment or removal from office by the governor. 47
In 2014, Mississippi amended its firearm preemption statute to include penalty
provisions modeled after Florida's punitive law. As in Florida, the Mississippi statute
creates a private right of action for declaratory and injunctive relief, granting success-
ful plaintiffs declaratory and injunctive relief and holding any "elected county or
municipal official under whose jurisdiction the violation occurred" civilly liable for
up to $1,000, plus attorney's fees and costs that may not be paid (or defended against)
through public funds.48 And in 2016, Arizona allowed private litigants to pursue per-
sonal sanctions against local officials who violate state firearm preemption bills. The
Arizona law states that an official found to have violated the preemption law may be
subject to termination from office, 49 allows for a civil penalty of $50,000 to be imposed
against a local government, and creates a private right of action against local govern-
ments to recover damages of up to $100,000 as well as attorney's fees and costs.5 0
" In 2016, Arizona adopted S.B. 1487, now codified as ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 41-194.01 (2017),
requiring the Arizona Attorney General to investigate local laws at the request of any state legislator, id.
5 49-194.01 (A); if the Attorney General finds the ordinance in conflict with state law or the Arizona con-
stitution, the local government must resolve the violation within 30 days or face a loss of shared state money
Id. 5 49-194.01(B). The Arizona Supreme Court recently upheld portions of the statute, although expressed
concerns about some of the statute's more punitive aspects. See infra text accompanying notes 81-85.
44 OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, 5 1289.24(D) (2017) ("When a person's rights pursuant to the protection of
the preemption provisions of this section have been violated, the person shall have the right to bring a
civil action against the persons, municipality, and political subdivision jointly and severally for injunctive
relief or monetary damages or both."). In November 2003, the Oklahoma Attorney General issued an
advisory opinion that the provision did not create civil liability for law enforcement officers seizing
unlawfully transported handguns, but the opinion did not address whether the provision would create
liability for local officials passing an ordinance in contravention of the preemption statute. Okla. A.G.
Op. No. 03-46, 2003 WL 22680002, at *5-7 (Nov. 3, 2003).
45 FLA. STAT. 5 790.33 (3)(c) (2017).
46 Id. 5 790.33 (3)(d).
47 Id. 5 790.33(3)(e) held unconstitutional by Marcus v. Scott, 2014 WL 3797314 (Fla. Cir. Ct.). The
law also gives affected individuals and groups a private right of action against local governments for declara-
tory and injunctive relief, as well as actual damages of up to $100,000 and attorney's fees. Id. 5 790.33(3)(f).
48 MISS. CODE ANN. 55 45-9-53(5)(a), (c) (2017). Unlike in Florida, before instituting suit, the af-
fected party must notify the state Attorney General of the alleged violation. If the Attorney General finds
a violation, the local government has 30 days to remedy it before the suit may proceed. Id. 5 45-9-53 (5)
(b). Local officials who did not vote for the infringing ordinance or who attempted to cure the violation
as noted by the Attorney General may claim an affirmative defense. Id. 5 45-9-53(5)(d).
49 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 13-3108(J) (2017).
so Id. 5 13-3108(I), (K).
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Perhaps most troubling, Kentucky in 2012 amended its firearm preemption statute
not only to create a private right of action 5 but to impose a criminal penalty on offi-
cials: "A violation of this section by a public servant shall be a violation of either KRS
5 522.020 [Official misconduct in the first degree] or 5 522.030 [Official misconduct
in the second degree], depending on the circumstances of the violation." 52 This practice
appears to be spreading, as Texas this past May included a criminal liability provision
in its anti-sanctuary cities preemption legislation.5
III. LEGAL STRATEGIES FOR RESISTING STATE PREEMPTION
Together, the combination of the breadth and range of current state preemption
legislation and the rise of punitive preemption risks fundamentally changing the nature
of local power just as cities are taking the lead in so many critical areas of policy. Cities
and their officials, however, are pushing back. Resistance to the rising abuse of state
preemption has involved organizing, coalition building, and political responses. But
legal arguments have also been central to how cities are responding. Historically, cities
have been understood to be relatively powerless to resist state oversight in a formal
sense, and, broadly speaking, that remains true. With states overreaching, however,
courts in recent years have sided with cities on a number of grounds. This Part reviews
the legal landscape emerging from current conflicts and highlights other legal issues
that preemption presents.
A. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO PREEMPTION
The legal grounds on which cities are challenging preemption derive primarily from
state constitutional law, on both substantive-home rule and restrictions on special
legislation-and procedural grounds.
1. Direct Constitutional Home Rule Immunity Claims
In the right circumstances, constitutional home rule can stand as a source of pro-
tection for local autonomy in conflicts with states. In Telluride v. San Miguel Valley
Corporation, for example, the Colorado Supreme Court held that a state statute that
sought explicitly to bar a town's use of eminent domain to acquire parks and open
space was an unconstitutional infringement on the town's home rule authority over
matters of local concern. 54 Of course, many states lack constitutional protection for
home rule and even in constitutional home rule states, courts can be wary of vindicat-
ing local authority, limiting the scope of constitutional protection to judicially-deter-
mined local or municipal spheres.5 5 That said, the case law is sufficiently mixed for
s H.B. 500, Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 65.870(4) (West 2017). The prevailing
party in such a suit is entitled to attorney's fees and costs, as well as expert witness fees. Id.
52 Id. 5 65.870(6).
53 Texas Senate Bill 4, signed into law in May, would provide that local law enforcement officials
face criminal penalties if they fail to comply with immigration detainer requests. See Texas Senate Bill
4, 5 5.02 (adding a new 5 39.07 to the Texas penal code). As noted, see supra note 40, the United States
District Court for the Western District of Texas enjoined a number of provisions of the bill this past
August 30th. See City of El Cenizo v. State of Texas, No. SA-17-CV-404-OLG, 2017 WL 3763098 (W.D.
Tex. 2017) (order granting preliminary injunction), injunction partially stayed by City of El Cenizo v.
State of Texas, No. 17-50762 (5th Cir. Sep. 25, 2017).
54 Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corporation, 185 P.3d 161, 169-71 (Colo. 2008).
s See Baker & Rodriguez, supra note 2, at Part III.
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this to be an avenue that local governments in constitutional home rule states will
continue to pursue.5 6
2. Generality and Anti-Special Legislation Claims
Another constraint on certain types of state preemptive legislation derives from
state constitutional provisions-found in roughly thirty-seven states-that require
some form of "generality" or "uniformity" or conversely that prohibit "special" or
"local" legislation.5 7 Although the jurisprudence is varied, statutes that relate to per-
sons or things as a class likely qualify as general laws, while statutes that relate to
particular persons or things within a class are special laws.5 State statutes may be
vulnerable on these grounds because they are "local" in the geographic sense, or dis-
criminate against a particular category, or are applicable only to government entities,
instead of including private parties. 5 9 Overall, the strongest examples of generality/
anti-special legislation principles make clear that individual cities cannot be unfairly
singled out, although in many states, the judiciary tolerates circumvention, for exam-
ple, by permitting legislation that does not expressly identify a particular target juris-
diction, even if in fact by operation only one jurisdiction is affected. 0
Traditionally, this jurisprudence has not been a significant source of protection for
local authority, but there are examples of the principle succeeding, and courts may
become more open to these claims as preemption becomes more targeted. For example,
in City of Cleveland v. State of Ohio, an Ohio trial court recently held that the state's
attempt to preempt Cleveland's well-known Fannie M. Lewis Resident Employment
Law-which sets modest, although important, requirements for the employment of
local residents in city-funded projects-violated the state constitution in part because
it was not a "general law."61 Drawing on long-standing Ohio precedent, the court noted
s Cf. id. at 1356 (noting that "the courts have frequently upheld municipal police power regulations
in the face of state efforts at control ... [making] clear that regulating the 'health, safety, and welfare' of
a locality is squarely within the scope of local affairs"). Some recent litigation has also involved chal-
lenges to the authority or validity of state legislation, as a threshold matter, prior to the question of the
legislation's preemptive effect. See, e.g., City of Cleveland v. State of Ohio (Court of Common Pleas,
Cuyahoga County, January 31,2017, Case No: CV-16-868008) (finding that Ohio lacked authority under
the Ohio Constitution to enact legislation to preempt local-hire provisions because the relevant consti-
tutional provision the state invoked-Article II, Section 34-requires that such legislation advance the
"comfort, health, safety and general welfare of all employees") (emphasis added).
s7 For an excellent recent examination of the nature and history of this subject (not focused on the
context of preemption), see Justin R. Long, State Constitutional Prohibitions on Special Laws, 60 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 719, 725-32 (2012).
ss Moreover, even for general laws, some states have independent "uniformity" requirements, some
of which apply to specific subject matters. The Ohio Constitution, for example, provides that: "All laws,
of a general nature, shall have a uniform operation throughout the State; nor, shall any act, except such
as relates to public schools, be passed, to take effect upon the approval of any other authority than the
General Assembly, except, as otherwise provided in this constitution." OHIO CONST. art. II, 5 26.
s9 JOHN MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 5 3:23 (2016) (enumerating categories of "special"
or "local" laws, but noting that the categories often blur in practice). An example of the kind of state
legislative targeting that can be upheld is the use of broad population categories-such as cities of more
than one million people-that may have only one member, although very narrow population categories
can fail. See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 3, at 307-10.
60 See, e.g., Treadway v. State, 988 S.W.2d 508, 510-11 (Mo. 1999) (holding that statutes that func-
tionally singled out one city could still be general "because they employ open-ended criteria... [that]
identify the counties by factors that change such as by reference to county classification, population,
charter status and nonattainment criteria").
61 City of Cleveland v. State of Ohio (Court of Common Pleas, Cuyahoga County, Case No: CV-
16-868008), Judgment Entry, With Opinion and Order Granting Permanent Injunction (Jan. 31, 2017).
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that to be a validly preemptive general law, a statute must be part of a statewide,
comprehensive enactment that applies uniformly throughout the state, and that regu-
lates conduct generally, rather than focusing solely on municipal authority-a test the
Ohio statute could not pass because it was so clearly targeted at limiting the power of
localities to act. 62 Similarly, because the Florida Constitution prohibits laws that single
out municipalities in Miami-Dade County, a trial court in Florida recently enjoined
a Florida statute that barred the beach community of Coral Gables from regulating
Styrofoam containers.' Although these examples might be outliers, they point to the
potential utility of special legislation claims in resisting preemption.
3. Procedural Claims
In some states, the constitution requires specific processes in order to pass local or
special laws. These additional legislative steps can act as a means of validating pre-
emption or other oversight of local governments. They also, however, can be a potential
ground for raising legal challenges if the procedures are not followed. 64 Beyond pro-
cedural mandates tied to special or local laws, most state constitutions contain provi-
sions that impose procedural limitations, such as that legislation address a "single
subject" and have a clear title. To ensure transparency, protect against logrolling, and
police against attaching unpopular riders to popular bills, single subject rules restrict
the subject matter of an enactment by the state's legislature to one general topic, so
that if, for example, a statute addresses preemption of a local ordinance and an entirely
unrelated issue, it may be constitutionally vulnerable.6 5 There are a number of similar
procedural constraints found in a variety of state constitutions. 66
Given the haste or lack of transparency with which some preemption legislation is
drafted, these once somewhat obscure procedural requirements have new salience.
The single-subject rule, for example, led the Missouri Supreme Court in Cooperative
Home Care, Inc., v. City of St. Louis, sitting en banc earlier this year, to invalidate the
62 Id. at 4-5.
63 Florida Retail Federation, Inc. v. The City of Coral Gables (Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial
Circuit for Miami-Dade County, Mar. 8, 2017, Case No. 2016-018370-CA-01).
64 These states include New York, Florida, Pennsylvania, Oklahoma, Louisiana, Missouri, and
Georgia. See Anthony Schutz, State Constitutional Restrictions on Special Legislation as Structural
Restraints, 40 J. LEGIS. 39, 48 n.40 (2014). Generally speaking, there are two basic procedures invoked
procedurally to validate local or special laws: either a supermajority is required, or notice is required.
See Treadway v. State, 988 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. 1999).
6s See generally Rachael Downey et al., A Survey of the Single Subject Rule as Applied to Statewide
Initiatives, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 579 (2004) (summarizing the application of the single subject
rule in states where it is applied to initiatives). Some 43 states have a form of single-subject rule embedded
in their constitutions. See Brannon P. Denning & Brooks R. Smith, Uneasy Riders: The Case for a Truth-
in-Legislation Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 957, 963; Martha J. Dragich, State Constitutional
Restrictions on Legislative Procedure: Rethinking the Analysis of Original Purpose, Single Subject, and
Clear Title Challenges, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 103, app. at 165-66 (2001).
66 Other general state constitutional procedural constraints on legislation that could be at issue in
the preemption context include requirements that all bills be referred to committee, that votes on bills
must be reflected in the legislature's journal, that no bill be altered during its passage through either
House so as to change its original purpose, that legislation must "age" for a certain amount of time before
being acting upon, and that appropriations bills contain provisions on no other subject. See generally
Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Limits on Legislative Procedure: Legislative Compliance and
Judicial Enforcement, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 797, 798-99 (1987).
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state's attempt to preempt St. Louis's 2015 minimum wage ordinance. 67 The decision,
however, highlights a limitation of these kinds of procedural challenges, namely that
it remains open to the legislature to re-enact the preemptive statute through proper
procedures, as Missouri appears to have done in response to Cooperative Home Care.68
B. FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS
Although many claims that cities are currently asserting in resisting state encroach-
ment are state-based, preemption also raises federal constitutional and statutory
concerns, notably around equal protection, voting rights, and potentially the
Establishment Clause.
There are at least three related legal theories that might support equal protection
challenges to state statutes that preempt local laws.69 First, statutes that intentionally
discriminate against a protected class, such as race and gender (which arguably includes
gender identity), or that impinge on a fundamental right receive some form of height-
ened scrutiny,70 requiring the state to justify the law as furthering a sufficiently impor-
tant interest (such as privacy or safety). Even without heightened scrutiny, state
preemption statutes might be vulnerable if the action is motivated by a "bare desire"
to harm a group and is not supported by any legitimate or rational basis, under the
Supreme Court's 1996 decision in Romer v. Evans.71 This theory might be applied to
statutes enacted with the primary purpose of preempting local ordinances that prohibit
67 See generally Cooperative Home Care, Inc., v. City of St. Louis, 514 S.W.3d 571 (Mo. 2017)
(holding that a statute that sought to preempt local ordinances violated Article III, Section 23 of the
Missouri Constitution because the statute contained more than one subject). Another quite recent example
can be found in a trial court's decision this past June that an Ohio statute that sought to preempt local
minimum wage ordinances that had been attached to a statute regulating dog sales and licensing pet
stores violated the single-subject rule in Article II, Section 15(D) of the Ohio Constitution. City of Bexley
v. State of Ohio, (Court of Common Pleas, Franklin County, June 2, 2017, Case No: 17CV-2672).
However, setting up a split in authority, another Ohio trial court found that the same statute did embrace
a single subject: "deprive municipal corporations of the ability to regulate such issues by the adoption of
local ordinances." City of Hudson v. State of Ohio (Court of Common Pleas, Summit County, July 7,
2017, Case No: CV-2017-03-1103).
68 See Mo. ANN. STAT. 5 290.528 (West 2017) (effective August 28, 2017).
69 The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that no state shall "deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
70 Some lower courts have concluded that distinctions based on sexual orientation should also receive
heightened scrutiny. See, e.g., Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d. 471, 484 (9th Cir.
2014) (applying heightened scrutiny to discrimination based on sexual orientation). To receive heightened
scrutiny, it is not enough to show a "disparate impact" on a racial group, rather the action must have a
classification on its face or must be motivated by intentional discrimination. See Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229, 247-48 (1976) (rejecting claim that facially neutrally statute is invalid under Constitution
only because it burdens one race more than another).
It is unlikely that preemption laws will facially classify on the basis of race, but some preemption laws
have already moved to classify facially on the basis of gender. North Carolina, for instance, recently limited
"sex" to "biological sex." See supra notes 26-27 (citing North Carolina's law on bathroom access). A strong
argument can be made that this is a facial classification, and thus should trigger heightened scrutiny
71 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634-35 (1996). Romer involved a challenge to Colorado Amendment
2, a state referendum that "prohibit[ed] all legislative, executive or judicial action at any level of state or
local government designed to protect" gays and lesbians, in response to local ordinances in three Colorado
cities that extended antidiscrimination protections based on sexual orientation. Id. at 624. The Court
ruled that Amendment 2 violated the equal protection clause, with Justice Kennedy's majority opinion
concluding that "laws of the kind now before us raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage
imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons affected." Id. at 634. According to the Court,
' [i]f the constitutional conception of "equal protection of the laws" means anything, it must at the very
least mean that a bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate
governmental interest."' Id. at 634-35 (quoting Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 528, 534 (1973)).
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sexual orientation discrimination, or, more generally provide a basis for arguing that
preemption laws violate equal protection when the facts show that these laws are driven
by animus-a "bare desire to harm"-towards an unpopular group. 72 Finally, the
Supreme Court has also articulated an equal protection political process rationale that
scrutinizes structural actions that place a "special burden" on the ability of minorities
to achieve their policy goals in the political process. 73 This rationale could apply to
statutes that reallocate power from the local level to the state level, although the recent
decision of the Supreme Court in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action
calls the status of this doctrine into question. 74
This political process argument is currently being advanced by the plaintiffs in
Lewis v. Bentley, a case in which several civil rights groups are challenging the State
of Alabama's preemption of the city of Birmingham's ordinance increasing the mini-
mum wage. 7s The argument is that by shifting decision-making authority from a city
with an African-American majority to a white-dominated state legislature, preemption
restructured decisionmaking in a manner that violated equal protection. The Northern
District of Alabama, in a February 2017 decision, rejected this argument. Granting
the State's motion to dismiss, the court expressed skepticism of the viability of the
doctrine after Schuette,76 and found unpersuasive the argument that the preemptive
statute contained a racial classification.7 7 The decision is currently on appeal before
72 The Supreme Court relied on Romer several years later in United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct.
2675 (2013). In Windsor, the Court held that DOMA, which effectively preempted state marriage laws,
constituted discrimination of an "unusual character," citing Romer and reaffirming the "animus" ratio-
nale. Id. at 2693 (explaining that " [i]n determining whether a law is motived by an improper animus or
purpose, "'[d]iscriminations of an unusual character"' especially require careful consideration" and
emphasizing that "[t]he Constitution's guarantee of equality 'must at the very least mean that a bare
congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot' justify disparate treatment of that
group") (citing Romer and Moreno). The Supreme Court, however, has only applied the Romer animus
rationale in cases in which the classification is present on the face of the statute. Romer and Windsor do
not present this as a limiting principle of animus review, but this factual context appears consistent with
the generally high bar for showing animus.
73 See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969); Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1,
458 U.S. 457, 467 (1982).
74 See Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight
for Equality by Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S.Ct. 1623,1637-38 (2014) (plurality opinion uphold-
ing voter-approved amendment to Michigan constitution prohibiting state universities' use of race-based
preferences in admissions and finding such amendment did not violate precedent of Hunter or Seattle).
7s In August 2015, the Birmingham City Council unanimously passed Ordinance 15-124, providing
an incremental increase in the minimum wage for Birmingham employees, starting with $8.50/hour in
July 2016 and increasing to $10.10/hour in July 2016. See Amended Complaint at 29, Lewis v. Bentley,
No. 2:16-CV-690-RDP, 2017 BL 29541 (N.D. Ala. Jun. 30, 2016).
76 Lewis v. Bentley, No. 2:16-CV-690-RDP, 2017 WL 432464, at *13 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 1, 2017) (ques-
tioning the "so-called" political process doctrine).
77 See id. (" [T]he Act has no racial classification and, on its face, calls for uniform economic policy
throughout the state.").
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the Eleventh Circuit, but does makes clear some of the difficulties in applying the
political-process framework.78
Finally, preemptive state laws that seek to achieve religious objectives, even with
purported secular purposes, could raise Establishment Clause concerns.79 Statutes,
for example, that preempt local civil rights provisions, even if facially neutral, can be
of concern if motivated by a desire to enable business owners to discriminate against
LGBTQ people based on religious beliefs. Courts would generally need to probe ques-
tions of legislative purpose, principal effects, and level of governmental entanglement
with religion to adjudicate these concerns. 0 This may be a future legal front in pre-
emption battles.
C. PUNITIVE PREEMPTION CHALLENGES
Courts are beginning to adjudicate questions related to issues of punitive preemp-
tion where states threaten financial penalties against local governments or local offi-
cials face civil or criminal liability. The Arizona Supreme Court in August 2017 upheld
some aspects of the state's sweeping new preemption law, S.B. 1487," but sidestepped
the constitutionality of the law's financial penalties against localities. In State ex rel.
Brnovich v. City of Tucson, the court found constitutional the provision of S.B. 1487
that allows a single legislator to request that the state attorney general investigate local
laws or other official local action for possible conflicts with state law. 82 The court did
not rule either on the statute's requirement that a city post a bond equal to six months'
worth of state shared revenue (which would have been more than $55 million for
Tucson had it applied) `-although it did express some concern about the require-
ment84-or on the provision of the statute that provides for an actual loss of state
funding thirty days after the Attorney General declares a local law is preempted. 5
These kinds of provisions thus remain to be adjudicated.
As to personal liability for officials, the federal District Court in issuing an injunc-
tion against the criminal provision in the Texas anti-sanctuary city law found that the
78 The Birmingham litigation also includes a claim that the state preemption law, HB 174, violates
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), 52 U.S.C. 5 10301 (2012). The Complaint alleges that HB 174
results in the denial or abridgement of Birmingham citizens' right to vote because it "reverses a scheme
of local control," shifting power "from the city council elected by the majority-black Birmingham elec-
torate to the Legislature elected by the majority-white state electorate." Lewis, Amended Complaint, at
37. The Complaint also claims that state legislative elections are not "equally open" to African Americans
who have less opportunity to participate and elect representatives of their choice due to the structure of
state-wide elections in Alabama. Id.; see also id. at 25-27. And the Complaint alleges that HB 174 was
enacted with the intent of "denying the majority black electorate" the ability to regulate the conditions
within their municipality in violation of the VRA. Although the District Court rejected the claim, see
Lewis, supra note 75, at *7-9, it remains to be seen how it will be addressed on appeal.
7' The Establishment Clause provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
so Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), supplies the prevailing Establishment Clause tests.
"First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must
be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive gov-
ernmental entanglement with religion."' Id. at 612-13. If the government's action or law violates any of
these tests, it will be found unconstitutional.
1 Codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 41-194.01 (2017).
82 State ex rel. Brnovich v. City of Tucson, 399 P.3d 663, 666 (Ariz. 2017), as amended (Aug. 17, 2017).
83 Id. at 667.
84 Id.
8s Id. at 669 n. 2 (reserving the question of the constitutionality of ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 41-
194.01(B)(1) (2017)).
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provision raised Fourteenth Amendment Due Process vagueness concerns. 6 Lack of
clarity about what constitutes the kind of "policy" or "action" necessary to trigger
criminal liability for local officials-in light of the significant consequences of assess-
ing such liability-could signal recurring concerns under the Fourteenth Amendment
and analogous state constitutional provisions. 7
There are a number of other grounds on which legislation that seeks to punish local
officials for acting in their democratically-elected capacities might also be vulnerable."
Preemption laws imposing civil or criminal sanctions on elected officials, for example,
may violate legislative immunity, a common law principle extended to local elected
officials in Bogan v. Scott-Harris." In Bogan, a unanimous Supreme Court held that
local officials are entitled to "absolute immunity from civil liability for their legislative
activities." 0 The Court further held that the acts of "voting for an ordinance" and
"signing into law an ordinance" were legislative acts.91 This principle-articulated in
Bogan in the context of interpreting a federal civil rights statute-is untested in the
state preemption context, but legislative immunity has long roots in the common law.92
Imposing liability-or even simply the threat of expensive litigation-on a local
official for fulfilling their official duties could also amount to an unconstitutional
restriction on local officials' free speech rights under either the federal First Amendment
8 City of El Cenizo v. State of Texas, No. SA-17-CV-404-OLG, 2017 WL 3763098 at *26 (W.D.
Tex. Aug 30, 2017) (order granting preliminary injunction), injunction partially stayed by City of El
Cenizo v. State of Texas, No. 17-50762 (5th Cir. Sep. 25, 2017).
87 Cf. Joseph Tartakovsky, Firearm Preemption Laws and What They Mean for Cities, 54:5 MUN.
LAWYER 9 (Sept./Oct. 2013), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/Tartakovsky-
Firearm-Preemption-Laws-ML-09.2013.pdf. Justice Gould of the Arizona Supreme Court, concurring
in the recent Tucson firearms preemption decision, see supra note 82, would have found the state statute's
provision requiring local governments to post a bond unenforceable because it is "incomplete and unin-
telligible." Brnovich, 399 P.3d at 683 (Ariz. 2017). Although not quite an explicit void for vagueness
argument, this concurrence used very similar reasoning.
" Another recent direct challenge to official personal liability in preemption, in a Florida case, side-
stepped the question of the validity of such liability Relying on the 2011 Florida statute that subjected indi-
vidual local officials to liability for promulgating local ordinances that regulate firearms, see supra text
accompanying notes 45-47, two firearms-rights groups sued Tallahassee, its mayor, and three city commis-
sioners individually regarding two preempted ordinances-passed in 1957 and 1984, respectively-that
prohibited the discharge of firearms in certain areas or city properties. Florida Carry, Inc. v. City of Tallahassee,
No. 1D15-5520, slip op. at 3-4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2017) (citing ordinances). Although the city had
not enforced either provision for years, the ordinances remained on the books. Id. at 4-5. The plaintiffs argued
that by failing to repeal the ordinances, the city was liable under the punitive preemption statute. In a techni-
cal, narrow holding, an intermediate state appellate court held that in not repealing the old ordinances, the
city had not actually "promulgated" preempted ordinances as required for penalties to kick in under the
statute, id. at 22, thus sidestepping the more challenging constitutional questions at issue.
89 Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 44 (1998).
90 Id. at 46.
91 Id. at 55.
92 Bogan was a case interpreting federal law-namely, 42 U.S.C. 5 1983. The Court held that 5 1983
incorporates legislative immunity for local officials, in part because the common law did so in 1871, when
Congress passed the original statute. The legislative immunity recognized in Bogan, therefore, is not a
free-floating concept, but rather one rooted in the history of the particular federal statute the plaintiffs
attempted to use to impose liability. Its applicability may be limited, therefore, when the state legislature
has spoken clearly to override this common-law doctrine.
It also bears noting that number of state constitutions-43 by one count-contain provisions analo-
gous to the U.S. Constitutions Speech or Debate clause, providing immunity to legislators for legislative
acts. U.S. CONST. art. I, 5 6, cl. 1; Steven F. Huefner, The Neglected Value ofthe Legislative Privilege in
State Legislatures, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 221, 224 (2003). By their own texts, however, these provi-
sions apply only to state legislators. Id. app. at 308-18 (listing all 43 provisions as of 2002), and it thus
might require constitutional amendment to extend to local officials.
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or under applicable state constitution provisions.93 In Nevada Commission on Ethics
v. Carrigan, the Supreme Court rejected a city councilor's First Amendment challenge
to a state ethics commission's decision to censure him for failing to abstain from voting
on a hotel and casino project application in which he had an interest.94 In doing so,
the Court held that restrictions on legislators' votes are not restrictions on their
"speech" for First Amendment purposes.9 s The scope of the Carrigan decision, how-
ever, might be limited by the relatively minor penalty imposed (a mere censure) and
the fact that it concerned conflict-of-interest rules, which the Court noted date back
to the early years of Congress.96 Provisions that penalize, rather than condition, the
exercise of individual local legislative authority may be more vulnerable.9 7
By criminalizing and punishing local democracy, moreover, this strain of preemp-
tion may be found to violate the structure of home rule in states that have established
it in their constitutions. Many state courts interpret their constitutional home rule
provision as protecting the ability of local voters to choose their form of government.
By criminalizing or punishing a city or local official for simply retaining laws on the
books that are no longer enforceable, as is always the case with validly preempted local
legislation, these statutes arguably infringe on the ability of local units to express
themselves as they see fit, even if they cannot implement local policy that conflicts
with state law.
IV CODA: AFFIRMATIVELY-IF CAREFULLY-REINFORCING
LOCAL DEMOCRACY
This Issue Brief has focused primarily on current and potential litigation challenges
to the troubling wave of preemptive legislation now roiling local governance. There
are more affirmative approaches to strengthening home rule, however, that may play
an important role in legal strategies to respond to preemption. Working to prevent
preemption before such legislation passes can be effective, but can also be challenging;
in the right circumstances, advocates can seek to repeal preemptive legislation, or look
to ballot initiatives to preserve local democracy. More ambitiously-and keeping an
eye on the potential for long-term advocacy to protect the space for local innovation-it
9' See Tartakovsky, supra note 87 at 8 (arguing that punitive preemption will lead to self-censorship
by municipal officials and "may effectively prohibit public discussion of an entire topic") (internal quota-
tions and citation omitted).
94 Nevada Commn. on Ethics v. Carrigan, 564 U.S. 117,117-18 (2011).
9S Id. at 125.
96 Id. at 122-23; id. at 134 (Alito, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the majority that a legislator's
vote is not speech, but concurring because the conflict-of-interest "recusal rules [for early Congresses]
were not regarded during the founding era as impermissible restrictions on freedom of speech").
'7 Recently, in a challenge to Texas's punitive anti-sanctuary law, the United State District Court
found that a provision forbidding local officials from "endors [ing]" any policy that would "materially
limit immigration law" was overbroad and vague and impermissible viewpoint discrimination under the
First Amendment. City of El Cenizo v. State of Texas, No. SA-17-CV-404-OLG, 2017 WL 3763098 (W.D.
Tex. 2017) (order granting preliminary injunction), injunction partially stayed by City of El Cenizo v.
State of Texas, No. 17-50762 (5th Cir. Sep. 25, 2017).
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may be possible to look to state constitutional change.9' In the original home rule
movement at the turn of the century and again in the post-World War Two wave of
home-rule reform,99 advocates made some progress embedding home rule reforms in
state constitutions. It may be time to revive those movements.
As a final note, as mentioned at the outset of this Issue Brief, it is important to keep
in mind that efforts to reinforce local authority and autonomy must recognize that for
all of their progressive potential, local governments can also be parochial and exclu-
sionary-or worse-and that there are fundamental constitutional values that must
remain state-wide and national in scope as a baseline. It is thus necessary to preserve
preemption as an appropriate tool to respond to local exclusion and parochialism,
even as cities push back against state overreach entirely unrelated to this kind of over-
sight. What is needed, then, is a long-term law reform effort to reinvent home rule,
beginning with a new understanding of localism that explicitly reflects progressive
values, recognizing that to be legitimate, local democracy must be inclusive and equi-
table. In the balance between uniformity and preserving space for local innovation,
devolution should be vindicated to the extent that it reinforces-or at least does not
impede-equitable, just policy.
CONCLUSION
At just the moment when so many cities have taken a leading role in advancing a
range of progressive goals-from expanding opportunity to advancing social justice
to protecting the environment-states are increasingly stepping in to block them.
This Issue Brief has surveyed major fault lines emerging in this contemporary clash
of state and local governments. There are legal strategies to be tested and policy
battles to be waged. But what is clear is that much more needs to be done to protect
local democracy.
9 In addition, the apparent relationship between politically gerrymandered state legislatures and
more aggressive preemption cannot be ignored. See Paul A. Diller, Reorienting Home Rule: Part 1-The
Urban Disadvantage in National and State Lawmaking, 77 LA. L. REV. 287, 336-42 (2016) (describing
the partisan bias in state legislatures after 2010). For more on post-2010 gerrymandering of state legisla-
tive and U.S. House of Representative districts, see DAVID DALEY, RATF4 4 KED: HOW THE DEMOCRATS
WON THE PRESIDENCY BUT LOST AMERICA (2016). Many of the states that have seen the most ferocious
preemption conflicts are decidedly "purple"-e.g., Florida, Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio, and
Wisconsin-yet their state legislatures have nonetheless consistently attacked local progressive priorities.
As articulated by the district court in Gill v. Whitford, a case now pending before the U.S. Supreme
Court, intentional political gerrymandering after 2010 allowed a conservative-leaning legislative majority
in Wisconsin to lock itself into power. Gill v. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 837 (W.D. Wis. 2016), cert.
granted (June 19, 2017) (No. 16-1611). The Supreme Court's resolution of Gill, as well as continuing
efforts in some states to amend constitutions to prohibit political gerrymandering, may help reduce the
frequency and intensity of state preemption of progressive local policies. See, e.g., Ariz. State Leg. v.
Ariz. Ind. Redistricting Comm'n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658 (2015) (reviewing and upholding, as applied to
U.S. House districts, Arizona's Proposition 106 from 2000 that aimed to end partisan gerrymandering
"for congressional as well as state legislative districts"); see generally League of Women Voters of Fla.
v. Detzner, 172 So. 3d 363 (Fla. 2015) (invalidating politically gerrymandered districts under the voter-
approved "Fair Districts Amendment" to the state constitution of 2010).
9 See supra note 2.
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